Complexity metrics and user strength perceptions of the pattern-lock graphical authentication method

One of the most popular contemporary graphical password approaches is the Pattern-Lock authentication mechanism that comes integrated with the Android mobile operating system. In this paper we investigate the impact of password strength meters on the selection of a perceivably secure pattern. We first define a suitable metric to measure pattern strength, taking into account the constraints imposed by the Pattern-Lock mechanism's design. We then implement an app via which we conduct a survey for Android users, retaining demographic information of responders and their perceptions on what constitutes a pattern complex enough to be secure. Subsequently, we display a pattern strength meter to the participant and investigate whether this additional prompt influences the user to change their pattern to a more effective and complex one. We also investigate potential correlations between our findings and results of a previous pilot study in order to detect any significant biases on setting a Pattern-Lock. © 2014 Springer International Publishing

Complexity metrics and user strength perceptions of the pattern-lock graphical authentication method

One of the most popular contemporary graphical password approaches is the Pattern-Lock authentication mechanism that comes integrated with the Android mobile operating system. In this paper we investigate the impact of password strength meters on the selection of a perceivably secure pattern. We first define a suitable metric to measure pattern strength, taking into account the constraints imposed by the Pattern-Lock mechanism's design. We then implement an app via which we conduct a survey for Android users, retaining demographic information of responders and their perceptions on what constitutes a pattern complex enough to be secure. Subsequently, we display a pattern strength meter to the participant and investigate whether this additional prompt influences the user to change their pattern to a more effective and complex one. We also investigate potential correlations between our findings and results of a previous pilot study in order to detect any significant biases on setting a Pattern-Lock. © 2014 Springer International Publishing

Hard Instances of the Constrained Discrete Logarithm Problem

The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) generalizes to the constrained DLP, where the secret exponent $x$ belongs to a set known to the attacker. The complexity of generic algorithms for solving the constrained DLP depends on the choice of the set. Motivated by cryptographic applications, we study sets with succinct representation for which the constrained DLP is hard. We draw on earlier results due to Erd\"os et al. and Schnorr, develop geometric tools such as generalized Menelaus' theorem for proving lower bounds on the complexity of the constrained DLP, and construct sets with succinct representation with provable non-trivial lower bounds

CROO: A universal infrastructure and protocol to detect identity fraud

Identity fraud (IDF) may be defined as unauthorized exploitation of credential information through the use of false identity. We propose CROO, a universal (i.e. generic) infrastructure and protocol to either prevent IDF (by detecting attempts thereof), or limit its consequences (by identifying cases of previously undetected IDF). CROO is a capture resilient one-time password scheme, whereby each user must carry a personal trusted device used to generate one-time passwords (OTPs) verified by online trusted parties. Multiple trusted parties may be used for increased scalability. OTPs can be used regardless of a transaction’s purpose (e.g. user authentication or financial payment), associated credentials, and online or on-site nature; this makes CROO a universal scheme. OTPs are not sent in cleartext; they are used as keys to compute MACs of hashed transaction information, in a manner allowing OTP-verifying parties to confirm that given user credentials (i.e. OTP-keyed MACs) correspond to claimed hashed transaction details. Hashing transaction details increases user privacy. Each OTP is generated from a PIN-encrypted non-verifiable key; this makes users’ devices resilient to off-line PIN-guessing attacks. CROO’s credentials can be formatted as existing user credentials (e.g. credit cards or driver’s licenses)

On the Use of the Negation Map in the Pollard Rho Method

The negation map can be used to speed up the Pollard rho method to compute discrete logarithms in groups of elliptic curves over finite fields. It is well known that the random walks used by Pollard rho when combined with the negation map get trapped in fruitless cycles. We show that previously published approaches to deal with this problem are plagued by recurring cycles, and we propose effective alternative countermeasures. As a result, fruitless cycles can be resolved, but the best speedup we managed to achieve is by a factor of only 1.29. Although this is less than the speedup factor of root 2 generally reported in the literature, it is supported by practical evidence

Counting points on hyperelliptic curves over finite fields

International audienceWe describe some algorithms for computing the cardinality of hyperelliptic curves and their Jacobians over finite fields. They include several methods for obtaining the result modulo small primes and prime powers, in particular an algorithm à la Schoof for genus 2 using Cantor's division polynomials. These are combined with a birthday paradox algorithm to calculate the cardinality. Our methods are practical and we give actual results computed using our current implementation. The Jacobian groups we handle are larger than those previously reported in the literature

A low-memory algorithm for finding short product representations in finite groups

We describe a space-efficient algorithm for solving a generalization of the subset sum problem in a finite group G, using a Pollard-rho approach. Given an element z and a sequence of elements S, our algorithm attempts to find a subsequence of S whose product in G is equal to z. For a random sequence S of length d log_2 n, where n=#G and d >= 2 is a constant, we find that its expected running time is O(sqrt(n) log n) group operations (we give a rigorous proof for d > 4), and it only needs to store O(1) group elements. We consider applications to class groups of imaginary quadratic fields, and to finding isogenies between elliptic curves over a finite field.Comment: 12 page

Samenwerking in ontwikkeling : productontwikkeling door uitbesteder en toeleverancier

Eindrapport van het project 'Kwaliteit in Innovatie door Samenwerking en Synergie". Dit rapport zat in de map, behorende bij het symposium: Partners in productontwikkeling : toeleverancier en uitbesteder; Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, 28 november 1996